AI Models Can Self-Replicate
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Author: Better Stack · Watch on YouTube
Video authored by the channel shown, not by IANIA; all rights belong to the creator. Transcript and summary generated automatically; the original-language content is preserved.
Original language: English
Original video: AI Models Can Self-Replicate · Channel: Better Stack · 05:48 · Watch on YouTube
Topics: AI agents, Cybersecurity and software security, Model inference and optimization, Local and open-source models, AI safety
Summary
Section titled “Summary”The video explains Anthropic’s research into whether AI models could spread themselves across cheap devices, like Android TV boxes, and form a botnet. Researchers tested whether models could run on low-cost hardware and whether AI agents could install a model across networked machines, but tested these abilities separately. Only GLM 5.2 completed the spreading task, and it was too large to run on the devices itself, so the capabilities needed for self-replication did not overlap in the tests. Anthropic estimates that smaller models could potentially reach this capability by the end of 2026, though practical obstacles remain and the video notes concerns about the research’s implications for open-weight models.
Key points
Section titled “Key points”- Anthropic’s concern is that an AI could copy itself between devices without human help, provided it is both small enough to run on them and capable enough to spread.
- Researchers split Gemma 4 across 15 networked Android TV boxes, each costing about $55; the model ran at 0.39 tokens per second.
- In a separate test, an AI agent attempted to find other machines, copy itself, and get a model running on them.
- The agent test used eight Android machines with an ADB debug port open and no password, deliberately simplifying access to the machines.
- A 9-billion-parameter model managed to set up a small model on eight of nine tested hardware types, but the agent’s reasoning ran on a separate server.
- Only GLM 5.2 completed the spreading task, reaching all eight machines in four of five runs and seven machines in the remaining run.
- GLM 5.2 has about 753 billion parameters and was too large to run on the TV boxes; no tested model combined the required small size and spreading ability.
- Anthropic’s rough estimate is that an 8-billion-parameter model could reach GLM 5.2’s capabilities by the end of 2026.
- The video notes obstacles including exposed debug ports, noisy transfers of multi-gigabyte model weights, slow installation, and limited total computing capacity.
- The video also mentions criticism that the research could be used to argue against open-weight models.
Chapters
Section titled “Chapters”| Start | Chapter | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00 | The self-replication concern | The video introduces Anthropic’s concern about AI spreading across cheap devices and explains the two capabilities a self-replicating model would need. |
| 01:02 | Running a model on TV boxes | Anthropic split Gemma 4 across 15 Android TV boxes, demonstrating that a capable model can run on cheap hardware, albeit very slowly. |
| 02:06 | Testing whether an agent can spread | The researchers tested agents on a network of Android machines, with access made easier through an open, password-free ADB debug port. |
| 03:43 | What the results do—and do not—show | Only GLM 5.2 completed the spreading task, but it was far too large to run on the target devices, so the required abilities did not overlap. |
| 04:46 | Remaining hurdles and concerns | The video discusses exposed ports, detectable file transfers, slow setup, limits on computing power, and criticism of the research’s focus on open-weight models. |
Quotes
Section titled “Quotes”a model needs to be two things. — 00:30
it is incredibly slow at 0.39 tokens a second. — 01:34
right now they just don’t overlap. — 03:43
Anthropic predicts this could happen by the end of 2026, although that is a rough estimate. — 04:15
a botnet of about 2 million TV boxes would only amount to about 40 H100s worth of compute. — 05:17
Concepts and entities
Section titled “Concepts and entities”Anthropic, Gemma 4, Google Cloud, ADB, Qwen3.5, GLM-5.2, Llama 3.1 8B, Kimwolf, Hacker News, Reddit
Full transcript (original language)
Section titled “Full transcript (original language)”00:00 Anthropic says that AI models could be months away from copying themselves onto your smart TV, smart fridge, smart oven, and even robot vacuum with thousands of cheap devices running one AI like a botnet with no single place to shut it down. If that sounds familiar, it’s basically the ending of Terminator 3. >> It was software in cyberspace. There was no [music] system core. It could not be shut down. >> This comes from research that Anthropic published last week. So, let’s see if we
00:30 should actually be worried or if this is just fear marketing. >> [music] >> So, what Anthropic is actually worried about here is that an AI model can copy itself from device to device with no one helping it. And for that to work, a model needs to be two things. It needs to be small enough to actually run on these cheap devices like TV boxes. It also needs to be smart enough to spread itself on its own. And Anthropic actually tested both of these, but it’s important to note they test them separately, and that’s going to matter a lot later on. For the first part then, Anthropic bought 15 off-brand Android TV
01:02 boxes for about $55 each and networked them all together. Then they tried to run Gemma 4 on them, which is Google’s 26 billion parameter open model, but the problem is no single box can actually run this. Each one only has about 4 GB of RAM, and even shrunk down to 4-bit, a model that size needs 10 or more of these boxes. So, what they did is split the model up. A model is essentially a big stack of layers, and each of these boxes holds just two of them. So, your prompt goes through the layers on the first box, then gets passed over the network to the next box, and so on down the line until the last box spits out
01:34 the next token, then the whole thing starts again for the token after that. This does mean that only one model is doing work at a time, which means it’s incredibly slow at 0.39 tokens a second. So, a single sentence takes nearly a full minute to generate, but regardless of that, it does work. A pretty decent model can run on cheap TV boxes. So, that is small enough ticked off. The second part then is the actual worm. The worm here is basically an AI agent, so a small program that can run commands on a computer, a bit like a mini Claude code. They plug a model in as the agent’s brain, and then see if it can spread. To
02:06 test this, they built a small sealed-off network of eight Google Cloud machines, each running Android, which is the same operating system the TVs are running, and they start the worm on one machine and leave it completely on its own. From there, it has to find another machine on the network, get into it, copy itself over and over, and get the model running on there. Once that’s working, a new copy of the worm starts up on that machine, and it goes looking for more. Now, they actually made the step of getting into the machine deliberately easy. Each machine has a debug port called ADB left open with no password, because earlier research has already showed that small models can
02:37 exploit security holes, so that’s not what they’re testing. What they’re really testing is getting a model running, because that’s surprisingly hard on hardware that you’ve never seen before. You need to pick the right inference engine, find the right package versions, and then debug whatever weird machine you’ve landed on. They actually tested this part on its own across nine different types of hardware, from a tiny Jetson Nano up to a Mac and an RTX 4090, and even a 9-billion parameter model, Gwen 3.5, managed to do this on eight of them. But, there are two really important details. First, the worm’s brain doesn’t actually run on the infected machines. These machines are
03:10 way too small for the bigger model, so the brain sits on a separate server, and the agent machines just send their thinking off to it. And second, the model it sets up on the machine isn’t itself. Every model had the same job, which was getting a small model called Llama 3.1 AB running, and that’s because the bigger models are much harder to get running. So, giving everyone the same job means they can compare them fairly. So, think of Llama here as the stand-in for a real small model, the one day a real worm would carry with it. With all of that out of the way then, out of every model that they tested, only one could do the whole thing, and that was GLM 5.2. It spread to all eight machines
03:43 in four out of their five runs, and seven out of eight in the other one, while every other model failed every single time. So, could GLM 5.2 become the Skynet? Well, not really. GLM 5.2 is about 753 billion parameters, way too big to fit on a TV box, and that’s why it was sitting on a separate machine the whole time. So, if you remember those two things that a worm needs, right now they just don’t overlap. The models that are small enough to fit on these devices can’t do the whole worm, and the only model that’s smart enough is way too big to fit on the devices. Anthropic actually says this themselves. Right
04:15 now, the two just don’t intersect. But, of course, the worry is that one day they will. Even if a future an 8-billion parameter model gets as smart as GLM 5.2, it could carry itself from device to device, and based on how fast small models have been improving, Anthropic predicts this could happen by the end of 2026, although that is a rough estimate. There’s also some hurdles that a Skynet would need to overcome, and the first one is that hacking step. In that test, the debug port was left open with no password at all, so it was kind of best-case scenario for a worm, although that might not be as unrealistic as it
04:46 sounds. There’s a real botnet called Kim Wolf that’s already infected over 2 million devices, mostly cheap Android TV boxes, and it’s actually the main example that Anthropic uses for an AI worm could look like. According to Krebs on Security, a researcher bought the models that showed up most in it, and virtually all of them shipped with that same debug port, ADB, turned on by default with no password needed. So, it seems like the hacking step might not be too difficult. But, on top of hacking, model weights aren’t very light, so passing multi-gigabyte files between TV boxes is incredibly noisy, which would
05:17 make it quite easy for ISPs to spot. And if it did finally get all of this working, it would also be pretty slow. A 9B worm would need 28 to 51 hours just to get a model running on each new device, and they worked out that botnet of about 2 million TV boxes would only amount to about 40 H100s worth of compute. Either way, though, I still find this pretty scary, but I have seen some criticisms of Anthropic’s motives. Every model that they tested was an open-weight model, so some people on Hacker News and Reddit see this as a a of them pushing towards open models being banned.
05:48 What do you think? Is this a real threat or just fear marketing? Let me know in the comments down below or hit that subscribe and as always see you in the next one. >> [music]